13/	1 1	45:12 =	1022
	Accident No	SEARCH STATE	
Checked by	W	2.10	15
Analyzed by			
Copied for Wr	eld by Ma	Copy .	_
Notes 6#	mex	Set	-
THE STATE OF THE S			

traly

REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

344th Bomb Co (M)

AIRC	Place 7 MILES SOU	nodel B-26		(5) A.	F. No. 43		Station		Control of the contro	7
	Organizațio	n: (7) 9TH E	mand and A	(ig Porce)	(Group)	101	495th B	anb Squadr	on (N)	Ser.
Dury	NAME (Last name)		RATING		RANK	PERSONNEL. CLASS	BRANCH	Am Ponce on Consulato	RESULT TO	Une or Pagaint
(10)	(11)		(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)
P	FLEMING, LAMA	R, III	P	0-686456	1st Lt.	18 >	AC	NINTH AF	Fatal	4No
IP.	GOUGE, CARL A	N N	P	0-815125	lat It.	18.2	_AC	NINTH AF	Minor	- 5
G	CARLSON, NORMA CHEVALIER, JOH		B	0-760155	lat Lt.	18 -	AC	HINTH AF	Patel	U
iG.	MC NULTY, ART		RG	32397099	T/Sgt.	20 /	AC	NINTH AT	Minor	- 5
G	FARLEY, ROBER		AG	31240508 19059919	T/Sgt.	20 1	AC	NINTH AF	Fatel	4 U g
-				TW0333T3	S/Sgt.	20.	AC	NINTH AF	Minor	S
-	***************************************									
	•									

				The same and the s	ET DATE OF	the latest and the la			61)
) .		MAR	III		0-686456	(22) lst	Lt. (2	3) 18	(24)	AC.
	(Last name) (Fir	st name)	(Middle in	itial)	(Berial number)	(R	ank)	(Personnel class	E) ((Branch
sig	ned (25) 9TH BD -	NINTH A	(26)	(Grow)	2 (27) 495	th Bomb	Squadron	(28) AAF	Station	4-59
igir	pal rating (33) P	(34) .29/		(30) (Grown resent rating (3		(36) 29/7/ (Date)	ron)	ment rating (3)	Station/ (Station)	
101 1/4 38 39	Pilor Hours: time of this accident) This type	(34) .29/	7/43 P	(Grown resent rating (3 4561 511 781)	5) P (Bating) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1	(36) 29/7/ (Date) instrument ti	me last 6 m	ment rating (3)	(Station) 7) 23/11/	2:00
(38) (39)	Pilor Hours: time of this accident) This type This model	(34) .29/	7/43 P	(Grow 150) (3 456) (456) (51) (76) (862)	5) P (Bating) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1	(36) 29/7/ (Date) nstrument ti nstrument ti light time la	me last 6 m me last 30 c st 6 months	ment rating (3)	(Station) 23/11/	2:00
(38) (39)	Pilor Hours: time of this accident) This type This model Last 90 days Total	(34) .29/	7/43 P	(Grow 150) (3 456) (456) (51) (76) (862)	5) P (Rating) 55 (42) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N 40 (45) N	(36) 29/7/ (Date) instrument ti instrument ti light time la	me last 6 m me last 30 c st 6 months	onths	(Station) 23/11/	2:00
(38) (38) (40) (41)	Prior Hours: time of this accident) This type This model Last 90 days Total DAY	(34) .29/	7/43 P	(Grow 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	55 (42) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N 40 (45) N Vaged	(36) 29/7/ (Date) instrument ti instrument ti light time la	me last 6 m me last 30 c st 6 months at 30 days_	onths	(Station) 23/11/	2:00
(38) (38) (40) (41)	PILOT HOURS: time of this accident) This type This model Last 90 days Total	(34) .29/	7/43 P	(Grow 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	55 (42) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N 40 (45) N	(36) 29/7/ (Date) instrument ti instrument ti light time la	me last 6 m me last 30 c st 6 months at 30 days_	onths	(Station) 23/11/	2:00
(38) (39) (40) (41)	Prior Hours: time of this accident) This type This model Last 90 days Total DAY	AAOR 44 Ay accident	7/43 P	(Grow 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	5) P (Bating) 55 (42) In 20 (43) In 00 (44) N 40 (45) N WAFT DAMAG	(36) 29/7/ (Date) Instrument till instrument till vight time la. (49) L18	me last 6 mm last 6 months at 30 days	onths.	(Station) 23/11/	2:00
(38) (39) (40) (41)	Prior Hours: time of this accident) This type This model Last 90 days Total DAY Alreraft Ingine(s) Propellier(s) Ingine(s) Ingine(s)	AAOR 44 Ay accident	7/43 P	(Grown Fesch Lands (3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	5) P (Bating) 55 (42) In 20 (43) In 00 (44) N 40 (45) N WAFT DAMAG	(36) 29/7/ (Date) Instrument till instrument	me last 6 mm last 6 months at 30 days	onths.	(Station) 23/11/	2:00
(38) (39) (40) (41)	Pilor Hours: time of this accident) This type. This model. Last 90 days. Total. Day Ireraft. Ingine(s). Venther at the time of	AAOR AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA	Visibiak grou	AIRCH Salvand haze.	55 (42) II 20 (43) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N 40 (45) N 40 (45) N 40 (45) N 40 (45) N 40 (46) N 40 (46) N	(36) 29/7/ (Date) Instrument till instrument	ton) 42. Instrume last 6 mm last 30 days FOR DAMAGE UNLIMI	onths.	(Station) 23/11/	2:00
(38) (39) (40) (41)	Prior Hours: time of this accident) This type This model Last 90 days Total DAY Alreraft Ingine(s) Propellier(s) Ingine(s) Ingine(s)	AAGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR	Visibiak grou	AIRCI Sali	(Bating) 5) P (Bating) 55 (42) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N 40 (45) N AFT DAMAG	(Squade) (36) 29/7/ (Date) Instrument till strument till sight time last sight sight time last sight sight time last sight si	ton) 42. Instrume last 6 mm last 30 days FOR DAMAGE UNLIMI	onths.	(Station) 23/11/	2:00
(38) (38) (40) (41)) J	PILOT HOURS: time of this accident) This type This model. Last 90 days Total. DAN Ireraft	AAGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR	Visibiak grou	AIRCI Sali	(Bating) 5) P (Bating) 55 (42) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N 40 (45) N AFT DAMAG	(Squade (36) 29/7/(Date) Instrument the strument the sight time law (40) L18' (40) L18' (40) L18'	ton) 42. Instrume last 6 mm last 30 days FOR DAMAGE UNLIMI	onths.	s calm,	2:00
(38) (38) (40) (41)) J	PILOT HOURS: time of this accident) This type This model Last 90 days Total DAY Afreraft	AAOR Augustion this instruments ation A-	Visibiak grou	AIRCI Sali	(Bating) 5) P (Bating) 55 (42) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N 40 (45) N AFT DAMAG	(Squade (36) 29/7/(Date) Instrument the strument the sight time law (40) L18' (40) L18' (40) L18'	Top Damas	onths.	s calm,	2:00
(38) (38) (40) (41)	PILOT HOURS: time of this accident) This type This model Last 90 days Total DAN Ireraft Ingine(s) Propeller(s) Veather at the time of leared from AAF 5t. Slot's mission Co	AAOR Ay Arcident thic instruments ation A-:	Visibility (Sa)	AIRCI Sali	(Bating) 5) P (Bating) 55 (42) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N 00 (45) N	(Squade (36) 29/7/(Date) Instrument the strument the sight time law (40) L18' (40) L18' (40) L18'	Top Damas	onths.	s calm,	2:00
(38) (38) (40) (41) (41) (41)	PILOT HOURS: time of this accident) This type This model Last 90 days Total DAN Ireraft Ingine(s) Propeller(s) Veather at the time of leared from AAF 5t. Slot's mission Co	AAOR Ay Arcident thic instruments ation A-:	Visibility (Sa)	AIRCH Salisal	(Bating) 5) P (Bating) 55 (42) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N 00 (45) N	(Squade (36) 29/7/(Date) Instrument the strument the sight time law (40) L18' (40) L18' (40) L18'	Top Damas	onths.	s calm,	43
(38) (38) (40) (41)) J	PILOT HOURS: time of this accident) This type	AAOR Ay Arcident thic instruments ation A-:	Visibility (53)	AIRCH Salisal	(Bating) 5) P (Bating) 55 (42) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N 00 (45) N	(Squade (36) 29/7/(Date) Instrument the strument the sight time law (40) L18' (40) L18' (40) L18'	Top Damas	onths.	s calm,	2:00
38) 39) 40) 1 1 C	PILOT HOURS: time of this accident) This type	AAOR A4 A4 A4 Associated this instruments ation A- mbat / Crashed 1	Visibility (SS)	AJS61 Salvase of accident To AAF St.	(Bating) 5) P (Bating) 55 (42) II 20 (43) II 00 (44) N (AFT DAMAG Veged Veged Veged Veged Veged Tes ation A-5	(se) 29/7/ (Date) Instrument the strument the sight time law (49) L18** (49) L18** (49) L18** (49) L18**	me last 6 mm last 30 cst 6 months at 30 days FOR DAMAS Kind of 6	onths. DED PARTS Contract Co	s calm,	2:00

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

(Brief narrative of accident. Include statement of responsibility and recommendations for action to prevent reposition)

Lt. Fleming and crew took off on a Combat sortie to Germany, flying B-26 Number 43-34426 in the #4 position of the lew flight of the first box. To stay in formation along the entire route, it was necessary to maintain extremely high manifold pressure and RPM setting. However, on the return route, Lt. Fleming was bringing home two 1000 pound bombs which were in the ship due to a rack malfunction. It is felt that the extra bomb load was largely responsible for the high setting Lt. Fleming had to use for the return.

Upon reaching the base, the weather became increasingly bad in due to a thick haze layer which extended to 2000 feet. Since Lt. Fleming was in the third flight it was necessary for him to make two 360 degree circles of base before starting instrument landing procedure. While aircraft was circling, Lt. Gouge, the co-pilot, checked the main gas gauges. These gauges registered 30 gallons for left tank and 330 gallons for right tank. As a further check, he checked the gauges in the bomb bay which were in accord with main gauges. However, gauges on right tank were inoperative. After Lt. Gouge returned to his position, the left engine cut out. Lt. Fleming and Gouge feathered engine and performed regular single engine procedure. At this time their altitude was about 1800 feet. The aircraft was unable to maintain altitude with 47" manifold and 2500 RPM on right engine and was losing altitude at the rate of 1000 feet per minute.

The pilot ordered the crew to bail out. The entire crew bailed out except Lt. Fleming. Their altitude at time of bailing out was approximately 300 to 550 feet above the ground. The bombardier's and radio operator's chutes failed to open. Immediately after last man bailed out, the ship crashed into a ridge.

It is the opinion of this board that the responsibility of this accident is due 100% to weather. If weather had been good, Lt. Fleming would have landed without trouble. Also it is felt, that if the weather had been better, their bombs would have been salveed and a single engine landing would have been made.

No recommendations.

(19) Cont'd.

It is the opinion of this board that Lt. Carlson's parachute did not open because the clamps which hold the parachute risers in place against the wearer's chest were loose when Lt. Carlson jumped, allowing the parachute pack and risers to become disengaged from the clamps before Lt. Carlson had a chance to pull the release handle.

Technical Sergeant Mc Nulty's parachute was open when he hit the ground. The board forms no opinion as to why T/Sgt. Mc Nulty's jump was unsuccessful.



Signature Corps.

LUCIUS D. CLAY, Jr., Major, Air Corps.

EMMANUEL SCHIFANI, Major, Air Corps.

RICHARD W. MAFRIE, Major, Air Corps.

4100

U. B. SUMMARKERY PRINTING SPRING. 10-00777-1

By Authority of The Commanding Office. 344th Bomb Gp (M)

495TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF 344TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF

APO 140, U. Gale 1944. "Initials

STATEMENT OF: First Lieutenant CARL A. GOUGE, 0 815 125

RE

: Crash Landing of B-26 Aircraft T5-Y, 43-34426, on 26 December 1944, at AAF Station A-59.

We started engines at 1200 and took off in the position of #4 plane in the lew flight of the second box. Our bomb load was four 1000 pound bombs. Our join up in formation was normal and all precautions of saving gas were used by changing to auto-lean. The target was the railroad bridge at Ahrweiler, Germany and there was no flak encountered. We proceeded out on course. The average manifold pressure was about 38" or 40" and the RPM at 2350, we had to hold these settings to fly a decent formation. After our altitude was gained the power settings were drawn back to about 35" and 2300 RPM. When we reached the bomb run and opened the bomb bays, we had to jam everything forward to stay in position, the run was made at the speed of 205 or 210 mph. I know this because I commented on the fact on the run itself. When the bombs were dropped, two of our 1000 pound bombs hung in the right side of the bomb bay, with the top bomb falling on the bottom bomb. After we had cleared enemy territory the bombs were de-fused and bomb hoist cables attached to the top bomb to release the strain on the bottom bomb shackle. When we had turned off the bomb rum I said to the engineer that we are going to run short of gas for at that time we had very little over 100 gallons in the left tank. On the way home it was the same thing 2300 RPM and 35" to keep in position. Our speed was between 230 and 240 mph, and then we were told that we were going to descend by flights through the haze. We were due at the field at 1526 and were on time. We let down to about 1800' indicated and were flying normal pattern. We had already made two 360° turns around the field and were flying 130° heading starting into the right turn. I had just returned to my seat after checking the gas tank gauges in the bomb bays to be sure that our gauges in the cockpit were right and they both checked identically, left tank showed 30 gallons and right tank showed 330, but the gauges were inactive on the right tank. As we started into the right turn our left engine cut out, so the pilot and I went through the regular single engine procedure. The haze was so bad that we couldn't see the ground and we were lesing 1000' per minute, according to the indicator, with 47" of manifold and 2500 RPM. At this time the pilot ordered the crew to bail out. The bomb bays were open when I looked back and the boys had already started jumping. (Staff Sergeant Farley and Technical Sergeant Mc Nulty jumped out of the waist window. Lieutenant CARLSON and Technical Sergeant Chavelier jumped out through the bomb bays). I sat there helping the pilot all I could 'till he told me to get the hell out, so I hurried back and jumped.

Carl G. Lange
Carl A. COUCH,
1st Lt., Air Corps.

Sworn and subscribed before me this 30th day of December 1944.

> EMBRETH H. WELKEN, lat Lt., Air Corps, Adjutant.

STATION WEATHER OFFICE DET. "QQ", 21ST WEATHER SQ. AIR STRIP A-59, U.S. ARMY

> APO 696, U.S. ARMY 30 DECEMBER 1944

SUBJECT: REPORT ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, IN VINCINITY OF AAF

STA. A-59, 27 DEC. 1944, AT 1535 HRS., 8-26, PILOT, FLEMING, LAMAR TIT, 1ST LT., 0-636456, CO-PILOT, GOUGE, CARL A. IST LT., 0-815125.


TO : ACCIDENT BOARD, AAF STATION A-59.

1. ACCIDENT OCCURED ON RETURN FROM MISSION. WEATHER FORECAST WAS RECEIVED BY TELETYPE FROM 9TH BOMBARDMENT DIV. AND BRIEFED TO CREWS BY STAFF WEATHER OFFICER.

- 2. FORECAST FOR BASE CONDITIONS AT RETURN WAS AS FOLLOWS: CEILING UNLIMITED, VISIBILITY 1-2 MILES, HAZARDS TO FLYING-POOR VISIBILITY AT BASES WITH MODERATE HAZE TO 2,500 FEET AND LIGHT TO MODERATE HAZE TO 4,000 FEET AND LIGHT HAZE ABOVE.
- 3. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RETURN WERE, CEILING UNLIMITED, VISIBILITY 4-800 YARDS, WIND CALM. VISIBILITY VERY POOR AT SURFACE DUE TO HAZE AND REFLECTION OF SUNLIGHT FROM HAZE.
- 4. PLANES TOOK OFF AT 1200 HOURS AND RETURNED 1515 HOURS.
 PLANES WERE ADVISED TO DIVERT BY 9TH BOMBARDMENT DIVISION. DUE
 TO LOCK OF FUEL, PLANES WERE ADVISED BY STAFF WEATHER OFFICER
 TO DIVERT TO A-58, THE CLOSEST AIR FIELD WITH SUFFICIENT VISIBILITY. LACK OF GASOLINE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PLANE TO REACH.
 DIVERSION STATION.

5. WEATHER REPORTED AT DIVERSION STATION AT 1530 HOURS: CEILING UNLIMITED, VISIBILITY 1 1/2 - 2 1/2 MILES.

PAUL R. FORANT,
1ST LT., AIR CORPS,
STATION WEATHER OFFICER




holis



SECRET

Office of the Commanding Officer



APO 140, U S Army 3 January 1945

360.33

SUBJECT: Report of Aircraft Accident.

TO:

Commanding General, 9th Bombardment Division, APO 140, U S Army

1. Transmitted herewith is AAF Form 14, Report of Aircraft Accident pertaining to aircraft type B-26GlO, number 43-34426.

For the Commanding Officer:

6 M MICHARD H LE FEVRE

Adjutant

1 Incl: AAF Form 14 (quad)

360.33 lst Wid BOMB

F-0-3

HEADQUARTERS 9TH BONBARDMENT DIVISION (M), APO 140, U. S. AFMY, 9 January 1945.

Top Gommanding General, Ninth Air Force, APC 696, U. S. Army.

Submitted in compliance with Memorandum 55-1, Headquarters Ninth Air Force, dated 27 November 1944.

For the Commanding General:

419

3 Inclas

Incl 1 - WD AAF Form 14 (in trip)

Incl 2 - Statement of Co-pilot (in trip)

'Inel 3 - Photos (in trip)

C. C. VEGA, INC.
LT. COLONEL, M.C.
ADJUTANT GENERA

0-6504

360.33 2nd Ind. HEADQUART RS NINTH AIRCORD, APO 696, US Army, 17 January 1915.

E-053-3

TO: Chief, Plying Safety, Army Air Forces, Winston-Salem 1, North Carolina.

THE PARTY IN THE STATE S

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

the control of a complete of the complete of the complete of the complete of the control of the

THE RESERVE OF THE PARTY OF THE

Report of Aircraft Accident Committee approved.

THE SECTION OF THE PROPERTY

I COMMITTERS OF STATE OF STATE OF SEC. OF STATE OF SEC.

A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR

For the Commanding General:

0-/131

1970

The later was

TO SHOW THE STATE OF THE STATE

The street of the state

S.V. HESLIN, Major, A.G.D., Asst Adj. Gon.

4 In 1s: Incl 1-3 (2 cys ea w/d) Incl 4- Added, Statement of Weather Off.

-TESTES

MEC!

10 M

SHEET SALLUNCERES TOWN

46.4 White M. 1- 27.25

CONTRACT OF SECURE SECTION AND A SECURIOR OF SECURIOR SECTION ASSESSMENT OF SECURIOR SECURIO

THE PAYS AND HER STREET, AND THE PAYS AND TH

(1) Place 7 MILES SOUTH OF AAF STATION A-59 27 DECEMBER 1944 (5) A. F. No. 43-34426 (0) Station AAF Station A-50 AIRCRAFT: (4) Type and model B-26G10 . Organization: (7) STE ED - MINTE PERSONNEL PERSONNEL. NAME (Last name first) AIR FORCE OR COMMAND RADE BRANCE DUTT RATING (11) (13)P P 0-686456 1st Lt. aC MINTH AF Fatal FLEWING, LAMAR, III Minor S 1st Lt. 0/1 0-615125 MINTH AF GOUGE. CARL A. AC AC MINTH AF CARLSON, MORMAN D 0-760155 32397099 CHEVALLER, JCHY A. AC RC MC NULTY. ARTHUR J 19059919 Minor 1 S FARLEY. ROBERT E (21) 0-686456 (22) 1st Lta. (23) 18 (Rank) (Personnel class) (Middle initial) (27) 495th Bomb Squadron (28) AAF Station A-59 A igned (25) 9TH BD - NINTH AF (26) 344th (Grow) (30) 344th (31) 495th Bomb Squadron AAF Station 4-59 . Attached for flying (20) STH ED - NINTH AF Original rating (33) P (34) 29/7/43 Present rating (35) P (Rating) FIRST PILOT HOURS: (at the time of this accident) 456:55 (42) Instrument time last 6 months. (38) This type..... 51,20 (43) Instrument time last 30 days 2,00 (39) This model.... 78:00 (44) Night time last 6 months. (40) Last 90 days ... 862140 (45) Night time last 30 days. AIRCRAFT DAMAGE DAMAGE Salvaged (46) Aircraft ... Salvaged (47) Engine(s). salvaged (48) Propeller(s) (50) Weather at the time of accident ... Visibility 400-600 yards, coiling unlimited, winds calm, thick (51) Was the pilot flying on instruments at the time of accident Yes (82) Cleared from AAF Station 4-59 (83) To AAF Station 4-59 (54) Kind of clearance Combat (58) Pilot's mission ... Combat (86) Nature of accident __Grashed into side of high ridge. Manther ... 505 (57) Cause of accident ... (50) Has Form 54 Been Submitted, No.

RESTRICTED

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

(Brief parrative of accident. Include statement of responsibility and recommendations for action to prevent repetition)

Lt. Fleming and crew took off on a Combat sortie to Germany, flying B-26 Number 43-34426 in the #6 position of the low flight of the first box. To gay in formation along entire route, it was necessary to maintain extremely high manifold pressure and RPM setting. However, on the return route, Lt. Fleming was bringing home two 1000 pound bombs which were in the ship due to a rack malfunction. It is felt that the extra bomb load was largely responsible for the high setting Lt. Fleming had to use for the return.

Open reaching the base, the weather became increasingly had due to a thick hase layer which extended to 2000 feet. Since Lt. Fleming was in the third flight it was necessary for him to make two 500 degree circles of base before starting instrument landing procedure. While aircraft was circling, Lt. Gouge, the co-pilot, checked the main gas gauges. These gauges registered 30 gallons for left tank and 830 gallons for right tank. As a further check, he checked the gauges in the bomb bay which were in accord with main gauges. However, gauges on right tank were inoperative. After Lt. Gouge returned to his position, the left engine cut out. It. Floming and Gouge feathered engine and performed regular single engine procedure. At this time their altitude was about 1800 feet. The aircraft was unable to maintain altitude with 47° manifold and 2500 RPM on right engine and was losing altitude at the rate of 1000 feet per minute.

The pilot ordered the crew to bail out. The entire crew bailed out except Lt. Fleming. Their altitude at time of bailing out was approximately 300 to 550 feet above the ground. The bombardier's and radio operator's chutes failed to open. Immediately after last man bailed out, the ship crashed into a ridge.

It is the opinion of this board that the responsibility of this accident is due 50% to weather and 50% to pilot error. It is felt that had the weather been good. Lt. Floring could have landed before the formation. However, this board is inclined to believe that Lt. Floring used poor judgement in not leaving the formation and landing at a field on the route home for refueling.

Due to total destruction of the bombay, no accurate rack malfunction could be traced, However, in past history of aircraft of this type, A-4 releases have been found very dependable. The possibility of a short in electrical circuit could cause a malfunction of this type. No percentage of responsibility is attributed to this malfunction because of the fact that aircraft have returned from combat missions with their full bomb load.

Mc Recommendations

ITM (19) Con'd.

It is the opinion of this board that Lt. Carlson's parachute did not open because the clamps which hold the parachute risers in place against the wearer's thest were loose when Lt. Carlson jumped, allowing the parachute pack and risers to become diseased from the clamps before Lt. Carlson had a chance to pull the release

Technical Sorgeant Mc Multy's parachute was open when he hit the ground.
The board forms actopinion as to why T/Sgt. Mc Multy's jump was unsuccessful.

Signature

marcis D. CIA

Richard W. Mallry

Why C. Issues

Date -18 FRUITALY 1945.

Hq 505 USAPP/8-43/25M/13350

195th BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF 344TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF

APO 140, U. S. Army, 30 December 1944,

STATISHENT OF: First Lieutenant CARL A. GOUGE, 0 815 125

RE

: Crash Landing of B-26 Aircraft Y5-T, 43-34426, on 26 December 1944, at AAF Station A-59.

We started engines at 1200 and took off in the position of # 4 plane in the low flight of the second box. Our bomb load was four 1000 pound bombs. Our join up in formation was normal and all precautions of saving gas were used by changing to auto-lean. The target was the railroad bridge at Ahrweiler, Germany and there was no flak encountered. We proceeded out on course. The average manifold pressure was about 38" or 40" and the RPM at 2350, we had to hold these settings to fly a decent formation. After our altitude was gained the power settings were drawn back to about 35" and 2300 RPM. When we reached the bomb run and opened the bomb bays, we had to jam everything forward to stay in position, the run was made at the speed of 205 or 210 mph. I know this because I commented on the fact on the run itself. When the bombs were dropped, two of our 1000 pound bombs hung in the right side of the bomb bay, with the top bomb falling on the bottom bomb. After we had cleared enemy territory the bombs were de-fused and bomb hoist cables attached to the top bomb to release the strain on the bottom bomb shackle. When we had turned off the bomb run I said to the engineer that we are going to run short of gas for at that time we had very little over 100 gallons in the left tank. On the way home it was the same thing 2300 RPW and 35" to keep in position. Our speed was between 230 and 240 mph, and then we were told that we were going to descend by flights through the haze. We were due at the field at 1526 and were on time. We let down to about 1800; indicated and were flying normal pattern. We had already made two 360 turns around the field and were flying 1300 heading starting into the right turn. I had just returned to my seat after checking the gas tank gauges in the bomb bays to be sure that our gauges in the cockpit were right and they both checked identically, left tank showed 30 gallons and right tank showed 330, but the gauges were inactive on the right tank. As we started into the right turn our left engine cut out, so the pilot and I went through the regular single engine procedure. The haze was so bad that we couldn't see the ground and we were losing 1000' per minute, according to the indicator, with 47" of manifold and 2500 RPW. At this time the pilot ordered the crew to bail out. The bomb bays were open when I looked back and the boys had already started jumping. (Staff Sergeant Farley and Technical Sergeant Mc Nulty jumped out of the waist window. Lieutenant CARISON and Technical Sergeant Chavelier jumped out through the bomb bays). I sat there helping the pilot all I could 'till he told me to get the hell out, so I hurraed back and jumped. Carl a Lauge

CARL A. GOUGE,

Sworn and subscribed before me this
30th day of December 1944.

KENNETH H. WELKEN, lst Lt., Air Corps, Adjutant.

DET. "QQ", 21ST WEATHER SQ. AIR STRIP A-50, U.S. ARMY

APO 696, U.S. ARMY 30 DECEMBER 1944

SUBJECT: REPORT ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, IN VINCINITY OF AAF STA. A-59, 27 DEC. 1944, AT 1535 HRS., B-26, PILOT, FLEMING, LAMAR III, 1ST LT., O-886456, CO-PILOT, GOUGE, CARL A., 1ST LT., O-815125.

TO : ACCIDENT BOARD, AAF STATION A-SO.

- FORECAST WAS RECEIVED BY TELETYPE FROM 9TH BOMBARDMENT DIV. AND BRIEFED TO CREWS BY STAFF WEATHER OFFICER.
- 2. FORECAST FOR BASE CONDITIONS AT RETURN WAS AS FOLLOWS: CEILING UNLIMITED, VISIBILITY 1-2 MILES, HAZARDS TO FLYING-POOR VISIBILITY AT BASES WITH MODERATE HAZE TO 2,500 FEET AND LIGHT TO MODERATE HAZE TO 4,000 FEET AND LIGHT HAZE ABOVE.
- 3. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RETURN WERE: CEILING UNLIMITED, VISIBILITY 4-600 YARDS, WIND CALM. VISIBILITY VERY POOR AT SURFACE DUE TO HAZE AND REFLECTION OF SUNLIGHT FROM HAZE.
- 4. PLANES TOOK OFF AT 1200 HOURS AND RETURNED 1515 HOURS.
 PLANES WERE ADVISED TO DIVERT BY 9TH BOMBARDMENT DIVISIOS. DUE
 TO LACK OF FUEL, PLANES WERE ADVISED BY STAFF WEATHER OFFICER
 TO DIVERT TO A-58, THE CLOSEST AIR FIELD WITH SUFFICIENT VISIBILITY. LACK OF GASOLINE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PLANE TO
 REACH DIVERSION STATION.
- 5. WEATHER REPORTED AT DIVERSION STATION AT 1530 HOURS: CEILING UNLIMITED, VISIBILITY 1 1/2 2 1/2 WILES.

PAUL R. FORANT, 1ST LT., AIR CORPS, STATION WEATHER OFFICER

es t

HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE AUTH: 03 FEE 1965

In Reply Refer

SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident.

3 FEB 1945

100

Commanding General, 9th Bomb Div (N), AFO-140, U. S. Army.

- 1. AAF Form No.14 and allied papers are returned herewith for further invest-
 - 2. Suggest the Aircraft Accident Committee reconsider factors of excessive fuel consumption due to high power settings in order to maintain formation and also the malfunction of bomb release.
 - 3. 100% responsibility cannot be attributed to weather as other aircraft of this Group apparently made safe landings upon return.
 - 4. The statement "If weather had been good, It. Fleming would have landed without trouble" is not conclusive or pertinent since it might also be said "If such high power settings had not been needed and if bombs had not hung up, It. Fleming would have landed without any trouble".
 - 5. Request further investigation and return of new findings in triplicate as soon as possible.

By command of Major General VANDENBERG:

0-1392

1 Incl.

Incl 1 - AAF Form No. 14 and allied papers. involving B-26GlO, No. 43-34426, Lt. Floming pilot, dtd 27 Dec'44. TER 1945

S. V. HESLIN Major, A.G.D., Asst Adj Gen.

IX DOMB

SECRET

Subject: Aircraft Accident (B-26G10, A.F. No. 43-34426).

360.33

1st Ind.

E-Q-3

HEADQUARTERS 9TH BOMBARDMENT DIVISION (N), APO 140, U. S. APRY, 6 February 1945.

TO: Commanding Officer, 344th Bomberdment Group (M), APO 140, U. S. Army.

1. For your compliance.

2. Report requested in paragraph 5 will be forwarded to this headquarters in quadruplicate as soon as possible.

By command of Major General ANDERSON:

1744

C. C. VEGA, JE.

LT. COLONEL, A

ADJUTANT GENERAL

4 Incls:

Incl 1 - AAF Form 14

Incl 2 - Statement of Co-pilot (in dup)

Incl 3 - Statement of Weather Officer (in dup)

Incl 4 - Photos (in dup)

Subject: Aircraft Accident (B-26G10, A.F. No. 43-34426). - 6463

2nd Ind.

G-W-32

HEADQUARTERS, 344TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF, APO 140, U.S. ARMY, 19 February
1945.

TO: Commanding General, 9th Bombardment Division (M), APO 140, U.S. Army.

Forwarded in compliance with basic communication and preceding indersement.

For the Group Commander:

SEB 1945

D F. WISNIEWSKI,

jor, Air Corps,

A N V

4 Incle: n/c.

SECRET

Subject: Aircraft Accident (B-26G10, A.F. No. 43-34426).
360.33

HEADQUARTERS TH BOMBARDMENT DIVISION (M), APO 140, U. S. ARUT, 21 February 1945.

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, APO 696, U. S. Army.

2520

c. c. c.

5 Incls:

Incl 1 thru 4 - n/c

Incl 5 - AAF Form 14 dtd 2 Jan. 45.

360.33 hth Ind.
HEADQUARTERS NINTH AIR FORCE, APO 696, US Army, 26 February 1945.

E-

TO: Chief, Flying Safety, Army Air Forces, Winston-Salem 1, North Carolina.

- 1. Reference is made to aircraft accident involving B-26G-10, AF No. 13-31426, piloted by 1st Lt. Lamar III Fleming, AC, O-686456, Accident occured 7 miles south of AAF Station A-59 on 27 December 1944.
- 2. The attached AAF Form No. 14 and allied papers with revised findings cancels the AAF Form No. 14 and allied papers pertaining to subject accident which was forwarded to your Headquarters under 2nd Indorsement dated 17 January 1945 to letter Headquarters AAF Station A-59, file 360.33, subject: "Report of Aircraft Accident", dated 3 Jan 1945.


For the Commanding General:

Incls: (1 Incl w/d)
Incl 1 thru 4 - n/c (2 cys ea w/d)
Incl 5- w/d

HAROLD L. CARTER, Lt. Colonel, ACD, Asst Adj General.

SECRET

PAR. 16410



NAME OF PILOT			TYPE OF PLANE			ACCIDENT NUMBER			
FLEMING LAMAR III			B-26910			45-12-27.522			
CHARGED TO:	OUT	IN	CHARGED TO:	OUT	IN	CHARGED TO:	OUT	IN	
Luly linique	3-22	3/22							
Paul Price		3/31							
•		•							
•					•				
	•						•		
•									
			•						
6									